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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

JACQUELINE D. FUNK

/

Plaintiff-Appellant

/

v.

/

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

/

Defendant-Appellee

/

Case No. 910196

Category No. 16

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court
granting defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2-2 (j).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Funk filed her class action complaint on November 29, 1990,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the Tax Commission's
practice of releasing state tax refunds to judgment creditors
pursuant to a writ of garnishment. Clerk's Notation of Record, at
1 (hereinafter "NR").

On January 24, 1991, the Tax Commission

filed a motion to dismiss based upon four grounds:

1

(1)

Lack

of

jurisdiction

for

failure

to

exhaust

administrative remedies;
(2)

Failure to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted;
(3) Failure to join an indispensable party; and
(4) Failure to allege compliance with the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. NR 24.
Plaintiff responded to the motion and a hearing was held
before the Honorable David E. Roth on March 6, 1991. NR 89. Judge
Roth found that the Tax Commission was authorized by statute to
honor the garnishments and that plaintiff's complaint had failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

NR 90.

Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was
granted.

The order was entered April 1, 1991 and a notice of

appeal filed April 4, 1991. NR 93.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
(1) Whether the Tax Commission is authorized by
statute to permit garnishment of a taxpayer's tax refund.
(2) Whether the Tax Commission by acquiescing to garnishment
of a tax refund violated plaintiff's rights under federal and state
law limiting the amount of earnings subject to garnishment.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
(a) Utah Code Ann. §78-27-15;
(b) Utah Code Ann. §78-27-16;
(c) Utah Code Ann. §63-30-6;
(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D(d)(viii);
2

(e)

15 U.S.C. §1673(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a judgment entered upon the grant of a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a
claim, the appellate court is both

"obliged to construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to
indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor." Arrow Industries
v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d

935,936

(Utah 1988).

Dismissal is appropriate only where it appears to a certainty that
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of
facts which could be proved in support of the claims asserted.
Freeaard v. First West National Bank, 738 P.2d 614,616 (Utah 1987).
The trial court's interpretation of the statute presents a question
of law.

Asav v. Wat kins, 751 P.2d 1135,1136 (Utah 1988).

The

appellate court accords conclusions of law no particular deference,
but reviews them for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp, 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to have
the Tax Commission's practice of honoring garnishments of state tax
refunds declared in violation of state law. NR 1-2,8. She sought
an injunction from any further garnishments of future tax refunds.
NR 8. The Tax Commission filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds,
among other things, that she had failed to state a claim upon which
3

relief could be granted.

NR 24.

This motion was granted by the

district court. NR 89.
b. Course of Proceedings
Funk filed her complaint on November 29, 1990. NR 1. The Tax
Commission filed a motion to dismiss on January 24, 1991 which was
granted on March 6. 1991. NR 89. An order was entered on April 1,
1991 and a notice of appeal filed on April 4, 1991. NR 90,93.
c.

Disposition of the Trial Court
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on

the basis that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
d.

The order was entered April 1, 1991.

Relevant Facts
Funk

complaint.

began

this

action with

the

filing

of

a verified

Defendant has not contested the facts as alleged.

During 1989, Funk was employed and had sufficient earnings to
require the filing of a state income tax return.

NR 5.

The

amounts withheld from Funk's earnings during 1989 resulted in an
overpayment of state taxes in the amount of $75.30.

NR 5.

Funk

filed a timely state income tax return for the 1989 tax year and
requested a refund of $75.30.

NR 5.

Also during 1989, Funk was

the defendant in litigation brought in the case of First Security
Bank of Utah v. Jacqueline D. Funk, Civil No. 893002970CV (Weber
County Cir. Ct., Ogden Department) which resulted in the entry of
judgment against her in the amount of approximately $1800.00. NR
5. On or about February 21, 1990, a writ of garnishment was issued
by the deputy clerk of the Weber County Circuit Court directing the
4

Utah State Tax Commission as garnishee to attach Funk's state tax
refund in the amount of $75.30.

NR 5.

Despite Funk's protests,

the State Tax Commission paid over to the judgment holder all of
her state tax refund.

NR 5-6.

Funk also had earnings during the

1990 tax year from which state taxes were withheld.

NR 5. At no

time was Funk ever employed by the state of Utah or any of its
subdivisions.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The primary issue in this case is whether the Tax Commission
may

disregard

the doctrine of

sovereign

garnishment of state tax refunds.

immunity

and allow

Funk asserts that the Tax

Commission overstepped the bounds of its authority by becoming
involved in private debt collection proceedings.

Funk will show

in the following pages that the state of Utah and its subdivisions
cannot be subjected to garnishment proceedings, unless sovereign
immunity

is

clearly

and

unequivocally

waived

by

the

state

legislature. The statute at issue, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-15, does
not clearly and unequivocally waive sovereign immunity so as to
allow a judgment holder to proceed against a sovereign state.
By

acquiescing

Commission

permits

to

garnishment

creditors

to

of tax refunds, the Tax
circumvent

restrictions

on

garnishment expressed in the Consumer Credit Protection Act and
Rule 64D.

The overpaid taxes never reached Funk and should have

been treated as disposable earnings not subject to garnishment *

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TAX COMMISSION IS BARRED FROM HONORING WRITS OF
GARNISHMENT, SINCE THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS NOT CLEARLY
AND UNEQUIVOCALLY WAIVED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THIS AREA,
It has been universally established that states enjoy a
general preservation of governmental immunity, and any exceptions
must be clearly established by the legislature. Epting v. State,
546 P.2d 242,244 (Utah 1976). Only the state legislature can waive
sovereign immunity and an attempt by a state subdivision to do so
is without legal effect.

Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. State*

Road Comm, 533 P.2d 882,883 (Utah 1975).

Although a state's

sovereign immunity from suit is grounded in the common law, the
Utah legislature has spelled out its preservation of general
immunity in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §6330-1.

In introductory language, the legislature made clear that:

Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home,
or other governmental health care facility,
and from an approved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public or
private facilities. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3
(1)
The language shows that the Utah legislature intended to preserve
the state's sovereign immunity, except in those limited areas where
it has undertaken to permit legal action.
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oounty, ci ty , t o w n ,
district,
board
of
education
or
other
subdivision of the state, and any officer,
board or institution, having in its possession
or under its control any credits or other
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statute,

personal property of, or owing any debt to,
the defendant in any action, whether as salary
or wages, as a public official or employee, or
otherwise, shall be subject to attachment,
garnishment and execution under such rights,
remedies and procedure as are or may be made
applicable to attachment, garnishment and
execution, respectively, in other cases,
except as in the next section [Section 78-27-1
16) provided. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-15 (1953).
This enactment by the Utah legislature, the Tax Commission asserts,
is a specific and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity to all
garnishment actions resulting from judgment being entered against
any Utah defendant.

Funk maintains that the statute is specific

in its language, waiving sovereign immunity only as to public
officers.
It is an accepted rule of statutory interpretation that a
court must first look at the plain language of the statute to
determine whether its meaning can be ascertained.

Berube v.

Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,1038 (Utah 1989).

A reading

of the statute shows that it is, first of all, directed at the
state of Utah or any of its subdivisions.

It waives sovereign

immunity as to any credits or other personal property under the
control of the state owed to certain defendants. The key question
1

The cross referenced section provides as follows:
78-27-16 Service of process.
The process shall be served only upon the
auditor of the legal subdivision garnished,
and, in case there is no auditor, then on the
clerk of the county, city, town, district,
board of education, or other subdivisions of
the state, or board of institution, and the
answer of such auditor or clerk shall be final
and conclusive.
8
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history, or other ruies of interpretation, to determine a si a ut*r ^
meaning,

Osualo v. Aetna Life and Cas. , 608 P. 2d 242 (Utah 19 80* .

There i s no ] egi si ati v e h i stor j per t a 1 11 i rig t 1 > thi s

t

1 rticular

section of the Utah .Code. A review of case law annotated under the
section shows that it appeared I n the compiled laws as early as
1 u'll"'

"Tribune Repor ter Printing Co, v ± Homer, 1 69 I 1 70 (Utah

1917

No history in the form of committee reports or s ta tements

fa\ Legislators was kept by the legislature at that time,
S revi ew

:::: f t:l ie earl y case

law interpreting

the

1 aw of

garnishment in this area does, however, lend suppor t to Funk's
position, for i t shows that the Court has consistently held that
tl*

.)jecti v e ::)f the 1 egi si a/tii re was to limit the exposure of
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public entities to garnishment proceedings so as to promote a
public policy of not becoming involved in litigation between
private individuals.

The earliest case discovered involved an

attempted garnishment of an Ogden teacher's $190.00 salary due him
from the Board of Education.
(Utah 1894).

Chamberlin v. Watters, 37 P. 566

The Court reviewed a general garnishment statute

found at section

3455 of the

1888 compiled

laws permitting

garnishment of a "person or corporation" and concluded that the
legislature did not intend to include "public corporations" within
the ambit of entities subject to garnishment.

In rejecting

garnishment of the teacher's salary, the Court observed:
Such proceedings would not only engage such
public corporation in much vexatious and
expensive litigation, but would also occupy
the time of its servants and officials in the
management of affairs wholly foreign to the
object of its creation, to the neglect of
corporate duties. The interests of the public
would thus become subservient to those of the
private individual, and the money in the
public treasury would be consumed at the bar
of the courts in controversies between debtors
and creditors, in which the public would have
not the slightest interest... While such a
proceeding, doubtless, would be desirable on
the part of the creditor, to enforce his claim
against the officer or servant of the
corporation, yet we are of the opinion that
public policy will not allow the corporation
to be thus hampered in the administration of
its affairs. Id., at 566.
In Tribune Reporter Printing, the Court had under consideration
whether the unearned salary of a public officer could be assigned
and garnished.

It reviewed section 3113x of the Compiled Laws of

1907 which contained the same language as now appears in the
10
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The court then set out a long list of cases wherein garnishment
against the United States was rejected.

The federal court made

clear that even though the government may have subjected itself to
garnishment proceedings for the enforcement of child support or
alimony payments, 42 U.S.C. §659, this did not represent a general
waiver of immunity.

It held:

The mere fact that sovereign immunity has been
removed in this one limited area does not
reflect a broader intent to remove sovereign
immunity in areas not specifically provided
for. Id., at 143.
The court observed that IRS was not holding the refund money as an
agent of the taxpayer. Instead, the money held by IRS remained the
money of the United States until it was paid over to the person
entitled to it.
By analogy, the federal case is strongly persuasive in this
proceeding. The state of Utah is equally immune from garnishment,
unless the legislature has specifically provided otherwise.

The

fact that the legislature has specifically addressed the issue of
crediting overpaid taxes in Utah Code Ann. §59-10-529 shows that
it knew how to legislate in this area, if it chose to do so. Had
it wished to subject tax overpayments to creditor's legal process,
the

legislature

would

have

done

so

specifically.2

2

An example of how a statute permitting
garnishment of a state in all cases can be found in the
Washington State Code:
State and municipal corporations subject to
garnishment - Service of writ
The state of Washington, all counties, cities,
towns, school districts and other municipal
12
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See also Morgan v.

I'Mihir Millstone Point Co. v. Rutka,

l4Hd I . ami G & J Investments Corp, v, Florida

Dept. of Health and Rehab, Services, 429 S.2d 391 (PI Amp 3 Dist •
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Commission,
eventuaJ I y
Arizona

The plaintiff brought suit, obtained a judgment ana
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Arizona reversed itself and resisted the garnishment.
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subject
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On appeal,

lie hi I Ii ill l tip sir dtp of Arizona was not
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employees

the state of

reviewed
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The statute, which

waqes

Arizona
owed

i.s simi .lar

Code Ann. §78-27-15, provides:
corporations sha 1 1 be subject to garnishment
after judgment has been entered in the
principal action, but not before, in the
superior and district courts, in the same
manner and with the same effect, as provided
in the case of other garnishees. \RSW §6-27040.
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its

to its

to U tali

§12-1601.

Salaries subject to garnishment.

The salaries of officers, deputies, clerks
and employees of the state or its political
subdivisions shall be subject to garnishment
as provided in this article, and such
garnishment shall not be construed as against
public policy.
The Arizona court reiterated the rule that since the remedy
of garnishment did not exist at common law, the state could not be
made a garnishee without legislative sanction.

Like the Utah

Supreme Court, the Arizona Court applied the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius maxim in reaching its decision. In other words,
since the Arizona

legislature

had

specifically

provided

for

garnishment of wages owing to state employees, it had thereby
excluded

garnishment

in

other

situations

involving

ordinary

citizens. The same reasoning is directly applicable in this case.
In addition to the legal maxim applied in Allred, several
other rules of statutory interpretation deserve consideration. One
accepted rule is expressed in the phrase, "eiusdem generis."
meaning that a general word preceded by specific words must be
interpreted as applying to persons of the same general class. In
this

case, the

Tax

Commission

relies

on

the

general

word

"otherwise" in arguing that Funk's tax return was subject to
garnishment. However, the general word "otherwise" is preceded by
the specific words "public official" and "employee". Applying the
rule of eiusdem generis, it follows that "otherwise" must be
interpreted in a way that is consistent with the preceding specific
words.

It refers, therefore, to other designations of persons who
14
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has

filed

jointly with the taxpayer subject to garnishment.

Plaintiff's second claim under the Consumer Credit Protection Act
("CCPA"), 15 U.S.C. 51673(a), raises the serious possibility that
the state of Utah may be violating a debtor's rights by allowing
creditors to garnish tax refunds without observing the limitations
imposed by federal law. As the case of G&J Inc. v. HRS indicates,
the Tax Commission's interpretation would subject even the state's
Medicaid office to claims for money owing to a nursing home.
Other

than §78-27-15, the Tax Commission

identified

no

authority in the Utah statutes where the legislature has expressly
and unequivocally authorized garnishment of the state.

Although

Section 63-30-6 waives immunity for actions to recover property,
it cannot be read as a waiver by the Utah legislature of immunity
from garnishment, especially when read in connection with section
63-30-22

which

expressly

prohibits

garnishment

against

the

governmental entity.3 Moreover, \Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm., 511
P*.2d 1286 (Ut. 1973), which construed section 63-30-6, held that
the Act must be strictly construed to preserve sovereign immunity.
It cannot be inferred from legislation authorizing a state to
be sued ex contractu, that it may also be sued in garnishment
proceedings.

G & J

Inv. v. HRS, 429 S.2d at 392.

There is a

significant difference between a state being sued as a defendant
on a contract and being sued as a garnishee.

The number of cases

in which the state may be the defendant in a contract action is
necessarily limited, but the number of claims to which it may
3

See appendix for text of statutes.
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There is little available case law considering whether a state
tax refund is subject to the CCPA.

The issue did arise in

Kokoszka, supra, wherein the United States Supreme Court ruled
that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, a tax refund was not
subject to the garnishment restrictions of the federal statute.
At first glance Kokoszka may appear to be controlling in this
appeal, but a closer examination reveals several points which
distinguish it. First of all, Kokoszka analyzed the issue within
the context of the Bankruptcy Act, with the Court noting that the
definition of "property" has been construed most generously when
analyzed under that federal law. Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 646. The
Court held that Congress had not enacted the CCPA with the intent
of altering the clear purpose of the Bankruptcy Act which is to
assemble a debtor's assets for benefit of his creditors.

While

acknowledging the important CCPA purpose of preventing creditors
from driving debtors into bankruptcy, the Court reasoned that to
define "disposable earnings" to include a tax refund that had
reached the trustee's hands would "alter the delicate balance of
a debtor's protections and obligations during the bankruptcy
proceeding." Kokoszka,. 417 U.S. at 651.
The facts here are significantly different.

In this appeal,

it is not a bankruptcy trustee that is seeking to retain possession
of a tax refund pursuant to the federal bankruptcy statute.
Rather, it is a private creditor proceeding according to a state
garnishment statute.

Unlike the tax refund in Kokoszka, the tax

refund in this case has never been in Funk's hands.
18

It remained

as money of the Tax Commission.

Therefore, this Court should not

be bound by the Kokoszka decision which considered a related issue
in a distinguishable context.
The tax refund in this case is disposable earnings, since it
had its source in wages and by definition is not subject to any
reduction for taxes.

Nothing is required by law to be withheld

from the tax refund.

The fact that the disposable earnings were

not paid out on a weekly basis, but rather accumulated as overpaid
taxes at the Tax Commission, is not dispositive of the issue. The
Tax Commission works in close conjunction with the employer in
withholding

taxes, unlike the

situation where

the property,

traceable to wages, has left the taxing authority and been placed
with a bank or bankruptcy trustee.

Here, the withheld taxes are

so closely connected with the employer as to remain wages for
purposes of the CCPA.
The source of the funds for the state tax refund is within the
meaning of the term "earnings" as defined in 15 U.S.C. §1672 (a).
There is no good policy reason for holding that the refund lost its
character as "earnings" once it reached the Tax Commission's hands.
Furthermore, since the entire refund qualifies as "disposable
earnings" it comes within the statute.

It would be unfair and a

punishment of the wage earner who, through no fault of her own, has
a portion of her wages set aside through income tax withholding to
later deny her the protection of the federal CCPA. An unscrupulous
creditor could then circumvent the CCPA by simply waiting until the
wages reached the hands of the Tax Commission and then executing
19

on them by garnishment.

Not only would this practice frustrate

the CCPAf but it would frustrate an objective of the Utah Tax Code
which is to encourage taxpayers to err on the side of overwithholding. A well informed taxpayer, aware that a tax refund
could

be

subject

to garnishment, would

likely minimize

her

deductions in order to reduce or eliminate the possibility of tax
overpayment.

The CCPA is remedial in nature and, therefore, any

exceptions to its coverage should be strictly construed. In re
Cedor, 337 F.Supp. 1103 (D.C. Cal. 1972), affd. 470 F.2d 996
(1972), cert, denied 93 S.Ct. 2148, 411 U.S. 973, 36 L.Ed. 2d 697
(1973) .
In Hodgson v. Christopher, supra, a federal court enjoined an
attempt by a creditor to circumvent the CCPA. The creditor argued
in Hodgson that once a judgment debtor's paycheck had been issued
it became personal property, thereby losing its identity as
"earnings" for purposes of the CCPA.

The North Dakota court, in

rejecting this argument, observed:
Regardless of whether the debtor-employee's
wages remain accrued but unpaid, or have been
reduced to a payroll check, whenever they
remain in the possession of the employer, they
are "withheld" within the context of the Act.
Not only is this in keeping with the spirit of
the CCPA, but it is logical.
Clearly, if
wages have not been turned over to the
employee, they are being withheld by the
employer. Any distinction to be drawn is in
form only, and does not change the nature of
the wages.
In this case, Funk's wages had not been turned over to her.
Although they were not being held by the employer, they were in the
hands of the Tax Commission and could not be released to her until
20

her tax return was filed.

A portion of her wages in the form of

overpaid taxes was being "withheld" at the time the garnishment was
issued.

As the Hodgson court further noted, to adopt the argued

for theory would permit a sheriff to wait until an employer had
issued his payroll checks and then execute upon them, thereby
avoiding the restrictions of the CCPA.

Noting that the Act must

be construed "in the light of common sense consistent with its
expressed purpose and intent...." the court held the defendants'
approach was prohibited.
Common sense tells us that the purpose of the CCPA, to protect
debtors from harsh garnishment procedures, would also be thwarted,
if creditors are permitted to garnish tax refunds held by the Tax
Commission.

The fact that Funk's wages remained in the hands of

the Commission is an important one, distinguishing this case from
Kokoszka. The Court may find properly that the garnishment scheme
acquiesced to by the Tax Commission violates Funk's federal rights
under the CCPA and her state rights under Rule 64D.
CONCLUSION
Funk has shown that the garnishment of her state tax refund
was done in violation of the law, since the Utah legislature has
never clearly and unequivocally authorized such a proceeding.
Sovereign immunity precludes the garnishment of state tax refunds.
The Tax Commission's acquiescence permits a creditor to circumvent
federal and state laws designed to protect debtors such as Funk.
The Court should reverse the lower court decision and reinstate
Funk's action.
21
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APPENDIX

63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions involving property.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for the recovery of any property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or
secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or
other lien said entity may have or claim on the property involved.
1965

Utah Code Annot. 56 3.-30-6

63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages prohibited — Governmental entity exempt
from execution, attachment, or garnishment.
<1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the
governmental entity for exemplary or punitive
damages.
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or portion of any judgment entered against a state employee in the employee's personal capacity even if
the judgment is for or includes exemplary or punitive damages if the state would be required to
pay the judgment under Section 63-30-36 or
63-30-37.
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may
not issue against a governmental entity.
1991

Utah Code Annot. 3C3-30-22

§ 1672*
Definitions
For the purposes of this subchapter:
(a) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or
otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retirement program.
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of any
individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any
amounts required by law to be withheld.
(c) The term "garnishment" means any legal or equitable procedure
through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for
payment of any debt.
(Pub.L. 90-321, Title III, § 302, May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 163.)

15 U . S . C .

§ 1673.

§1672

Restriction on garnishment
Maximum allowable garnishment

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section
1675 of this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of
an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not
exceed
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by section -206(a)(1) of Title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable,
whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a
week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the
Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in paragraph (2).

15 U . S . C .

§1673

(vi) A writ of garnishment attaching earnings
for personal services shall attach only that portion of the defendant's accrued and unpaid disposable earnings hereinafter specified. The writ
shall so advise the garnishee and shall direct the
garnishee to withhold from the defendant's accrued disposable earnings only the amount attached pursuant to the writ Earnings for personal services shall be deemed to accrue on the
last day of the period in which they were earned
or to which they relate. If the writ is served before or on the date the defendant's earnings accrue and before the same have been paid to the
defendant, the writ shall be deemed to have been
served at the time the periodic earnings accrued;
(vn) "Earnings" or "earnings from personal
services" means compensation paid or payable
for personal services, whether denominated as
wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise,
and includes periodic payments pursuant to a
pension or retirement program. "Disposable
earnings" means that part of a defendant's earnings remaining after the deduction of all
amounts required by law to be withheld. For purposes of a garnishment to enforce payment of a
judgment arising out of a failure to support dependent children, earnings also include, in addition to those items listed above, penodic payments pursuant to insurance policies of any type,
including unemployment compensation, insurance oenefit payments, and all gam denved from
capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion
of capital assets or as otherwise modified or
adopted by law for the support of dependent children
(vin) The maximum portion of the aggregate
disposable earnings of defendant (if an individual) becoming due the defendant which is subject
to garnishment is the lesser of
(A) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's
disposable earnings (fifty per centum for a garnishment to enforce payment of a judgment
arising out of failure to support dependent children) computed for the pay period for which
the earnings accrued, or
(B) The amount by which the defendant's
aggregate disposable earnings computed for
the pay period for which the earnings accrued
exceeds the number of weeks in the period
multiplied by thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair Labor
Standards Act in effect at the time the earnings are payable
dx) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court,
the garnishee shall treat the defendant's earnings becoming due from the garnishee as the defendant's entire aggregate earnings for the purpose of computing the sum attached by the garnishment.
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